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JOURNALISM POLICE
GERALD G. ASHDOWN*
The title of this piece is its own refutation-there are no journalism police,
of any sort. Both the national and state governments have structural checks
and balances. Public officials can be censored, impeached, and voted out of
office. Service people, professionals, and businesses, as well as private
individuals, are liable for their misdeeds. But due to New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan' and the matrix of Supreme Court decisions that followed, the press
is largely immune from any kind of accountability. There are no structural
controls, review boards, elections, impeachments, or effective system of
private litigation to serve as a check on media behavior. The New York Times
line of decisions effectively eliminated the libel and privacy actions 2 as a
form of media control. Because of media overreaching and this lack of
responsibility, I suggested in a rather modest article in 1994 that the actual
malice standard of New York Times be replaced with one based on negligence
for all libel plaintiffs.3  Since this also has been obliquely suggested by
another prominent commentator in the defamation/free speech area, 4 it is
worth reexamining.
I. "OR OF THE PRESS"
The Press Clause in the First Amendment5 serves a function beyond
freedom of speech. Individual free expression has a communicative goal, but
it also fosters personal autonomy and the self-fulfillment of the speaker. In
contemporary America, however, individual speakers, unless they have
developed a pulpit through financial independence or media attention, simply
* James A. "Buck" and June M. Harless Professor of Law, West Virginia University, College
of Law.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); see generally Gerald G. Ashdown,
Media Reporting and Privacy Claims: Decline in Constitutional Protection for the Press, 66 KY. L.J.
759 (1977-78) [hereinafter Ashdown, Media Reporting].
3. Gerald G. Ashdown, Whither the Press: The Fourth Estate and the Journalism of Blame, 3
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 681 (1994) [hereinafter Ashdown, Whither the Press].
4. See David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 487 (1991)
(Professor Anderson does not base any of his suggested reforms on media shortcomings.).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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do not have the ability to make a serious impact on the marketplace of
information. On the contrary, a free press facilitates the dissemination of
information in our culture. Unlike free speech, freedom of the press does not
serve any role in the development of the speaker; its justification is providing
information to the public. It is the principal constitutional role of the
American news media to collect, distill, and publish stories about life,
religion, law, medicine, politics, etc. so that we can govern ourselves
effectively in a participatory democracy. Freedom of expression incorporates
the right to speak and the right to hear or receive information, and it is the
media that largely fulfills the latter function. In addition to this distributional
role, however, the news media also performs another constitutional task:
guardian of the public trust. Under the First Amendment prerogative, it is the
responsibility of the press to review and evaluate public officials, functions,
and events in order to expose the good, the bad, and the ugly. It is the job of
the media to investigate and comment on public people and institutions so all
are aware of how well government is functioning.
Besides simply disseminating the news to foster participatory government
and facilitate decisionmaking in a complex culture, it is the constitutional
responsibility of the news media to take an active, watchdog role that goes
beyond merely reporting on matters of public interest. It is this guardianship
role that leads to investigative reporting, evaluation, and news commentary.
These twin functions of a free press-distributing information and overseeing
governmental operations-have led to strict constitutional protection for the
media and concomitantly to media excesses.
Since the press has the constitutional imprimatur to do more than just
collect and report the news, the public is provided a steady dose of evaluation
and analysis, which results in an angle, or "spin," being placed on every story
of even tangential public interest. The news media view it as their role, if not
obligation, to get to the bottom of every story, to determine who or what is
responsible, and to decide who is to blame.6 The rush to perform this
function, combined with ever increasing media outlets driven by the internet,
cable news networks, and 24/7 news, has led to a media whirlwind to break
the story, get the scoop, and expose the culprits. This self-indulgent diet of
analysis of public persons and public affairs not only shapes public opinion,
which is reflected back at the ballot box, but it also invades privacy, unfairly
damages reputations, and misleads the public along the way. For example,
take Congressman Gary Condit who evidently had nothing to do with the
disappearance of the intern Chandra Levy, but leading up to the discovery of
her body, the public was treated to a ruthless and persistent onslaught of
6. See generally Ashdown, Whither the Press, supra note 3.
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media exposure of Condit's and Levy's private lives, including a not too
oblique suggestion that Condit was responsible for Levy's plight.7 This is the
stuff that libel is made of were it not for the necessity of satisfying the New
York Times rule, which requires the proof of actual malice-defined as
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.8
Other examples of high profile media attacks include wrongly blaming
General William Westmoreland for the United States' failure in Vietnam, 9
suggesting that former Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was responsible
for the massacre of Palestinians at refugee camps in West Beirut,'0 blaming
Michael Jordan's gambling for a Chicago Bulls loss in an NBA playoff
series," and The New Yorker magazine writer Janet Malcolm allegedly
fabricating ill-serving quotations by psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson., 2  In
1993, a contract killer followed the twenty-seven steps in a book published by
Paladin Press entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent
Contractors. 13 Also in 1993, with an experienced police officer attempting to
dissuade a suicidal man barricaded in his home from committing suicide, a
reporter, without police permission, contacted the man, and then ran a taped
interview on the six o'clock news. The man, Bruce Clift, killed himself
minutes later while watching the telecast.' 4  On a more general note, the
inclination to sensationalize, and simultaneously mislead, is depicted in the
fact that homicide coverage on network news increased 473 percent from
1990 to 1998 while homicides actually decreased thirty-three percent during
that time. ' 5 No one needs to be reminded of how the rush to judgment led to
the disastrously premature network prediction that presidential candidate Vice
President Al Gore would prevail in the State of Florida in the 2000
presidential election.
7. See Petula Dvorak & Allan Lengel, Levy Family Still Hoping for Answers, WASH. POST,
May 1, 2005, at A7.
8. N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
9. Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
10. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
11. Frank Luksa, NBA Not Willing to Gamble When It Comes to Its Superstar, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 6, 1993, at 4B.
12. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
13. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 839 (S.D. Md. 1996) (granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment in the face of an admission that in "publishing, marketing,
advertising and distributing Hit Man .... [defendants] intended and had knowledge that their
publication would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and would-be criminals to plan and execute the
crime of murder for hire, in the manner set forth in the publications").
14. See Clift v. Narragansett Television, 688 A.2d 805, 807 (R.I. 1996).
15. Lori Dorfinan & Vincent Schiraldi, Off Balance: Youth, Race & Crime in the News,
BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH (Apr. 2001), http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/media/media.-
html.
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The contemporary news media see their primary role as one of policing
sociopolitical processes. This role requires much more than just reporting.
As in the case of all police work, investigation and analysis are necessary,
with the ultimate goals being detection and exposure. Contrary to customary
police work, however, speed of discovery to outdo the competition is the key.
Although there is some inter-agency squabbling between offices and
departments with overlapping jurisdiction, the normal police investigatory
process is careful and deliberate in an attempt to discover the identity of the
true offender and not wrongly accuse the innocent. But in addition to their
civic responsibility, the police are liable for false arrest, excessive force, and
violation of constitutional rights. In comparison, the press is virtually
immune from liability and not subject to any recourse whatsoever for those
harmed by incomplete investigations and premature reporting. Members of
the news media, of course, are aware of this; the lack of responsibility has
created a self-propelled symbiosis between an unsanctionable press and
sloppiness, sensationalism, and exaggeration. It is the public, and
concomitantly the democratic process, which has suffered from this
phenomenon, both in the form of distortion of events and the development of
distrust of the news media. 16  The latter is as problematic as the former
because when the public does receive reliable guidance from the press it is
often viewed with skepticism, the "crying wolf' phenomenon-undermining
the sound functioning of the Press Clause in the First Amendment.
Things are not well inside freedom of the press when a system is in place
that encourages, or at least does not discourage, the reporting of inaccuracies,
and simultaneously the public is reluctant to credit the solid and accurate
reporting it does receive. If this is the legacy that New York Times has left, it
is time for its holding and the body of law flowing from it to be reexamined.
This can be viewed as heresy, but a regime that has undermined the
philosophy for its own existence should not be viewed as sacrosanct,
especially in the realm of constitutional principle. Nowhere is the doctrinal
trap more dangerous. A critical eye must be kept on even the First
Amendment. 17
16. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 534-35.
17. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245
(1961) (Those who subscribe to the absolutist view believe that the First Amendment unqualifiedly
protects speech, press, assembly, or petition whenever those activities are used for the governing of
the nation, and this extends beyond public discussion of public issues and the dissemination of
information and opinion on those issues, to the dissemination of information about education,
philosophy, art, and science as well.).
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II. MEDIA LIABILITY
A. The Early Cases
In 1964, when the United States Supreme Court decided New York
Times,18 the media was largely unprotected from libel litigation. The
defendant had the burden of proving the story true, and there was no excuse
for reasonable care-liability attached absolutely to the publication of a
falsehood. 19 Although a defense of fair comment had developed,2 ° it did not
protect a media defendant from liability for the publication of inaccurate
factual information. 2' New York Times dramatically changed all this, and it
came at a time and in a case that screamed for protection of the press. The
case arose during the height of the civil rights movement in the South. L.B.
Sullivan, an elected commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, charged with
supervising the police, sued The New York Times and four black Alabama
clergymen for running a paid political advertisement that portrayed the plight
of black leaders and civil rights workers involved in the civil rights struggle in
Alabama.22 Even though there were only minor inaccuracies in the
advertisement, and the copy never referred to Sullivan and only occasionally
referred to the police, an Alabama jury awarded Sullivan $500,000, the
maximum requested, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed that award.23
In this context, recognizing the inadequacy of the defenses of truth and
fair comment to protect a free press from the self-censorship of both true and
marginal material, the Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment's Free
Press Clause to require that, in order to recover, a public official plaintiff must
prove "actual malice," defined as publishing with knowledge of falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth.24 From the timing and facts of the case, there
was a clear need to protect the press from internal and external controls on the
discussion of both public officials and public issues.
The Court in fact viewed the issue this broadly, for in relatively short
order it extended the actual malice protection to suits by public figures 25 as
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. 1 FOWLER HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.5 (1956); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 401 (2000).
20. DOBBS, supra note 19, § 420.
21. A small number of jurisdictions also protected factual inaccuracies if the misstatement was
not malicious. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 287 (Kan. 1908).
22. N. Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 256-57.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 279-80.
25. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 28
2006]
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well as public officials, and then for a time to all defamation actions involving
a matter of public interest regardless of the character of the person defamed. 26
Although a few years later the Court returned to the public/private plaintiff
dichotomy, permitting private persons to recover based on a negligence
standard,27 the media continued to be insulated from libel actions by the broad
conception of who was a public official,28 by the application of the public
figure label to private persons involved in public events,2 9 and by the
requirement that even truly private plaintiffs prove falsity 30 and negligence.
Also during this time, the Supreme Court eliminated the action for invasion of
privacy against media defendants if the story exposed was of public interest
31
or was a matter of public record.32
In addition to the legal rules, there are a number of pragmatic factors that
undermine any legitimate threat of libel litigation. First, there is the
reluctance of defamed persons to sue. A libel suit resurrects the negative
publicity causing further harm and subjects the plaintiffs life to the discovery
process as the defendant attempts to show that the story was accurate (or at
least not malicious) or that the plaintiff suffered no damages, all while the
plaintiff must prove the story both false and reckless (or at least negligent).
"The truth rarely catches up with a lie." 33 Second, all lawsuits are expensive,
requiring either a very well healed plaintiff or a contingency fee arrangement
with a lawyer. In the latter case, the lawyer is likely to be willing to proceed
only if he or she can seek presumed or punitive damages, which require proof
of actual malice. 34 Third, a libel suit against a media defendant is likely to be
unsuccessful. Eighty percent are disposed of through summary judgment in
favor of the defendant; 35 of the remainder, around twenty-five percent fail to
(1967).
26. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1971).
27. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
28. For example, the courts have consistently classified police officers, regardless of rank, as
public officials. See, e.g., Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757, 762 (Me. 1981) (stating that all courts treat
law enforcement officers as public officials as a matter of federal constitutional law). For cases
classifying plaintiffs as public officials, see John B. McCrory et al., Constitutional Privilege in Libel
Law, 1 COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1989, at 516-27 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1989).
29. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
30. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986).
31. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Ashdown, Media Reporting, supra note 2, at 766-
68.
32. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
33. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
34. Id. at 349-50.
35. See David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel
Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503, 509-10 (2001).
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survive defendant's post-trial motions; 36 and an actual plaintiff's judgment is
more likely than not to be reversed on appeal.37 This is not a pretty sight for a
person contemplating vindication in court. Lastly, there is the availability of
libel insurance for prospective media defendants, covering both judgments
and litigation costs 38 for the infrequent cases where the plaintiff prevails.
Of course, reporters, editors, and publishers are aware of the current libel
law regime. This works in combination with a couple of additional factors:
first, the news media's view of their role, and, second, competition to create a
press corps whose self-indulgence is matched only by its collective
ruthlessness. Members of the media see their duty as not just the purveyors of
news and information (the dissemination function), but more importantly as
watchdog and investigator of sociopolitical and cultural life (a speaker's
function). Although the First Amendment clearly accommodates both of
these functions, the press has aggrandized and elevated the latter into
predominance. This requires more than just reporting; every story must be
given a twist, a spin, or an angle, blame laid, and those responsible exposed.
Added to this is the mass competition between news sources that technology
has made possible. The drive to beat one another with a story has naturally
led to much precipitous reporting before a lead can be adequately checked
out. When the aggrandizement of the investigator's role and the need for
speed are combined with the lack of any accountability for erroneous
reporting, the result can be sensationalism at best, and, at worst, inaccuracy
and misinformation, libel, and invasion of privacy. If my perception of the
contemporary press is accurate, and I think it is, then the press needs some
policing. First Amendment values are not served by sensationalism and
misinformation. The free market of ideas, like a free market economy, simply
cannot tolerate unregulated power.
B. Trends
After the Warren Court cases of the '60s and early '70s, the Court's media
libel decisions meandered somewhat, indicating differing doctrinal views. 39
Somewhat of a plaintiff's trend, however, is discernable. In 1974, in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,4 ° the Court reversed its position that the New York Times
actual malice standard applied to libelous statements about private individuals
36. Id. at 515.
37. Id. at 515-16.
38. Id. at 518-19.
39. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §12-12 (2d ed.
1988).
40. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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involved in matters of public interest, 41 and held that the states were free to
apply a negligence standard in the case of private plaintiffs. Although public
figure status was not limited to someone with general fame or notoriety with
especial persuasive power or influence, neither was involvement in public
events enough to make one a public figure. Gertz and Time, Inc. v.
Firestone42 require that in order to become a public figure for a limited range
of issues, the plaintiff had to thrust himself into a public controversy "in order
to influence the resolution of the issues involved., 43 Thus, the public figure
category was restricted to matters at the core of self-government and freedom
of expression, assimilating it to that of public officials. The Court could have
continued to take a broader view of the First Amendment, retaining the public
interest standard of its earlier Rosenbloom decision, but it refused, ostensibly
to offer more protection to the reputations of private individuals.44 In reality,
however, the Court took a narrower view of freedom of the press, limiting the
protection of the actual malice standard to the discussion of public officials
and those with potential impact on public issues. Restricting the New York
Times rule to coverage of those with political influence signaled somewhat
less solicitude for the news media.45
Not too long after the Court drew the distinction between public and
private plaintiffs, the press was refused an editorial privilege in libel litigation.
In Herbert v. Lando,46 a producer for the CBS program "60 Minutes" claimed
that a discovery request and order calling on him to answer questions
concerning his conversations, conclusions, deductions, intent, and state of
mind in researching and preparing a program would have an intolerable
chilling effect on the editorial process violating the First Amendment.47
Defendant argued that open discussion between reporters and editors would
be dampened and editorial judgment impaired.48 Justice White's majority
opinion concluded that the real inhibition resulted from fear of publishing
knowing or reckless falsehoods and that this was consistent with prior cases.49
The majority ultimately felt that an editorial privilege available to the
41. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
42. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
43. Id. at 453 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-46 (arguing that private individuals, unlike public figures, neither
had access to the media to counteract false statements nor had assumed the risk of publicity, and thus
the state's interest in compensating them for defamation was correspondingly greater).
45. See generally Gerald G. Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-
Making, 61 MtNN. L. REv. 645 (1977) [hereinafter Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone].
46. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
47. Id. at 171.
48. Id. at 173.
49. Id. at 171.
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publisher of an alleged libel would constitute a substantial interference with
the ability of plaintiffs to establish the critical subjective element of reckless
disregard for the truth by direct inquiry into the publisher's thoughts,
opinions, and conclusions.50
Although the Court is right that inquiry into the editorial process is
necessary to facilitate proof of New York Times malice,51 not much attention
was paid to the other side of the balance. Both Justices Brennan and Marshall
were correct, in separate dissents, to distinguish between an editor's "thought
processes," which would be chilled only if journalists stopped working
altogether, and discovery requests involving communications in the
newsroom between reporters and editors.52 With respect to the latter, both felt
that an editorial privilege was necessary to protect editorial judgment and
decisionmaking from inhibition and harassment. 53  It is this aspect of the
Herbert decision that exhibits insensitivity to the publication process and
freedom of the press. With the availability of the actual malice rule, the
greatest threat to press freedom was not actual damage awards, but the
financial and temporal burdens of litigation and discovery. Plaintiffs bent on
revenge and lawyers set on deep discovery into journalistic judgment to earn a
contingent fee could not help but impact the editorial process, either through
harassment, delay, and the diversion of energy or, more profoundly, by
discouraging communication between reporters and editors,
counterproductively diminishing the thoroughness and accuracy of reporting.
Viewed in this light, Herbert can be seen as procedurally reinstituting some of
the restraint eliminated by the adoption of the substantive standard of
recovery in New York Times. Fifteen years after New York Times, the Court
was already realigning the interests.
Although in the decade of the 80s, media defendants did enjoy some
success in the Supreme Court, 54 two relatively recent decisions again suggest
less deference to media interests.55 Of the two, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co. 56 is the more significant because it marked the end of the opinion rule,
which had developed from the following often-cited passage from Gertz:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
50. Id. at 170.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 193 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 207 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 194-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 209 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. Ashdown, Whither the Press, supra note 3, at 689.
55. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
501 U.S. 496 (1991).
56. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
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idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.57
As other defendants successfully had done previously,5 8 the Lorain
Journal relied on this language to defend itself against Milkovich's libel
action. A reporter for defendant's newspaper had suggested that the plaintiff,
a high school wrestling coach, had lied under oath at a proceeding before the
state athletic association.59 Although the Ohio state courts held that the
plaintiff was not required to establish actual malice, they concluded that the
assertions amounted to "constitutionally protected opinion.' 60 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a "separate
constitutional privilege for 'opinion' is required to ensure the freedom of
expression guaranteed by the First Amendment., 61 - He concluded that the
word "opinion" in the second sentence quoted from Gertz referred to the word
"idea" in the first sentence. 62 Ideas are protected but statements in the form of
opinion are not when they contain provably false assertions of fact.6 3 The
Court concluded that free expression was adequately protected by the
requirement that the plaintiff prove both falsity and fault,64 as well as by the
line of cases providing "protection for 'statements that cannot "reasonably
[be] interpreted as stating actual facts" about the individual."'' 65 The Court
explicitly refused to adopt a separate constitutional privilege for opinion. 66 It
is now clear after Lorain Journal that statements in the form of opinion that
contain provable false assertions of fact, and are not loose hyperbole, subject
the author and publisher to liability.67
When Lorain Journal is read along with Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine,68 the other media libel case decided by the Supreme Court in the
90s, it appears the Court has recognized the potential media abuse of the
insulation provided to them by the New York Times cases. Masson involved
57. 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
58. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 505-06.
59. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. at 3.
60. Id. at 7-8 (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ohio 1986)).
61. Id. at 21.
62. Id. at 18.
63. Id. at 18.
64. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
65. Anderson, supra note 4, at 508-09 (quoting Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. at 20).
66. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. at 21.
67. See id.
68. 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
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the alleged fabrication or embellishment by author Janet Malcolm of quotes
attributed to psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson.6 9 The plaintiff claimed that he
never made the statements placed in quotation marks. 70 The Supreme Court
reversed the grant of summary judgment for the defendant provided by the
lower courts, holding that this journalistic action could satisfy the actual
malice standard if "the alteration result[ed] in a material change in the
meaning conveyed by the statement., 71 Due to the realities of converting a
speaker's words into print, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion rejected the
contention that any change beyond the correction of grammar and syntax
represents actual malice, concluding that "[i]f an author alters a speaker's
words but effects no material change in meaning, including any meaning
conveyed by the manner or fact of expression, the speaker suffers no injury to
reputation that is compensable as a defamation., 7 2 Nevertheless, the Court
rejected the "rational interpretation" standard employed by the court of
appeals.73 This approach protected an altered quotation as long as it is a
rational interpretation of what was actually said.74 Justice Kennedy rejected
this test where the author is- not relying on ambiguous sources, but is
purporting to convey an actual statement of the speaker.75
Were we to assess quotations under a rational interpretation standard, we
would give journalists the freedom to place statements in their subjects'
mouths without fear of liability. By eliminating any method of distinguishing
between the statements of the subject and the interpretation of the author, we
would diminish to a great degree the trustworthiness of the printed word and
would eliminate the real meaning of quotations.76
Although the Court in Masson consistently refers to quotes and quotation
marks, it cannot be that a reporter could circumvent the holding by simply
reporting what a speaker said without placing the language in quotation
marks. Such a result would "essentially emasculate the holding., 77 Rather,
any misrepresentation of a speaker's remarks that "results in a material
change in the meaning" amounts to actual malice under New York Times.7 8
What this means for the news media is that misquoting or mischaracterizing a
69. Id. at 500-01.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 517.
72. Id. at 516.
73. Id. at 520.
74. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 501
U.S. 496 (1991).
75. Masson, 501 U.S. at 519.
76. Id. at 520.
77. Ashdown, Whither The Press, supra note 3, at 697.
78. Id. at 695.
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source's statements, if it can be proven, will result in liability.79
Milkovich and Masson taken together establish that the Supreme Court has
been careful to prevent members of the news media from overstepping their
roles as investigators or analysts. Analysis or conclusions, which embellish a
story by putting a cast or spin on it, or which contain provably false assertions
of fact, or misrepresent, or mischaracterize a source's remarks are not
constitutionally protected. This seems to be a message from the Court telling
the press that it will not be allowed to abuse the protection of its First
Amendment role provided by the New York Times cases. It is fair to say that
Gertz, Firestone, Herbert, and finally Lorain Journal Co. and Masson
represent a leavening of the Supreme Court's deference to the press in the
wake of New York Times. Milkovich and Masson are the clearest examples of
the Court's unwillingness to tolerate damage to reputations and the
marketplace of information caused by the media venturing from good faith
efforts at accuracy.
Unfortunately, this recasting of the constitutional law of libel has had little
effect on the media. Examples include the frenzies over the O.J. Simpson
trial, Bill Clinton's private life, the Elian Gonzalez affair, Congressman Gary
Condit and the disappearance of Chandra Levy, 80 and, most recently,
disappearing white women in the summer of 2005.81 No system of internal
self-control has developed for the press because of mass competition, and, as
importantly, because there is no mechanism of external control. In reality,
libel law is dead as a means of accountability. The actual malice standard of
New York Times and its implementation have done a very effective job of
preventing press self-censorship. The concern at the time of the New York
Times decision was avoiding the self-censorship of true as well as false
information, which the fear of libel litigation and judgments was thought to
create. In the 1960s and 1970s, we were right to be concerned about this
threat to freedom of the press. The facts of New York Times itself indicate as
much. However, the impact of the constitutional malice standard not only has
been to remove the threat of self-censorship of true and accurate information,
but also to discourage internal constraints concerning the publication of
falsehoods, misrepresentations, exaggeration, and sensationalism. This has
79. Id.
80. Levy's body was found in Rock Creek Park in Washington, D.C., apparently the victim of a
homeless assailant. See Dvorak & Lengel, supra note 7.
81. Charles Molincaux et al., Runaway Bride: Wedding 'Postponed,' Not Off, CNN, May 1,
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/us/04/30/wilbanks.found; Ken Penhaul, Teen's Disappearance A
Criminal Case, CNN, June 5, 2005, http://www.CNN.com/2005/world/americas/06/04/missing.teen-
/index.html.
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reached the point where the public no longer trusts the news media.8 2 The
twin constitutional functions of the press-facilitating the marketplace of
information and acting as caretaker of good government and civic
responsibility-are dependent on the dissemination of reliable, trustworthy
information on which we all can rely. When this breaks down, either in
reality or appearance, freedom of the press is no longer operating as designed.
Libel law is currently failing to accomplish anything, except to completely
insulate the media from any incentive to ensure that they are effectively
performing its constitutional role; reputations are damaged, misinformation is
distributed, media hysteria is encouraged, and the press is immune from any
recourse. Libel law is no threat to the press for a number of reasons, the most
significant of which is the virtual impossibility of a plaintiff recovering. For
the past twenty years, the Libel Defense Resource Center studied libel and
related claims against media defendants, releasing two reports in 2000
containing statistics on litigation.83 These reports reveal that nearly eighty
percent of the time media defendants won pretrial dismissals. 84 Although, of
the cases that actually went to trial, plaintiffs prevailed well over half of the
time, 85 trial judges reversed roughly a quarter of these,86 and of the remainder,
only a third completely survived appeal.87 Another revealing statistic is that
nationwide the media had to defend only an average of 21.9 libel trials a year
during the 1980s and 1990s. 88  Given the number of media outlets, the
potential for defamation is striking, and when compared to the total number of
tort cases filed each year,89 the results are startling. This is not a pretty
picture for libel victims contemplating the financial and emotional expense of
libel litigation, or for plaintiffs lawyers weighing the chances of recovering a
contingent fee. It is, however, a very pretty scenario for potential news media
defendants who realize that they do not have to fear libel suits. The
constitutional requirements afford the press a virtual absolute privilege to
publish and broadcast false stories.
In addition to the unlikelihood of recovery, members of the press realize
the reluctance of a libeled person to sue. The financial and emotional
expense, the additional exposure brought about through discovery, and the
82. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 534-35.
83. Logan, supra note 35, at 509 (analyzing contents of 2000 Reports on Appellate Results and
Trials and Damages Performed by the Libel Defense Resource Center, available at
http://www.medialaw.org.).
84. Id. at 510.
85. Id. at 513.
86. Id. at 515-16.
87. Id. at 516.
88. Id. at 512.
89. Id. at 513.
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additional publicity resulting from the libel action are all natural and strong
deterrents. 90 Recently, a prominent plaintiff's libel lawyer stated publicly that
he "caution[s] against bringing a libel action" because "the decks are about as
stacked against a plaintiff as they possibly could ever be." 91
C. Current Libel Law
The most obvious result of the current libel regime is that personal
reputations are left unprotected. When an individual is defamed-when
damaging lies about him or her are spread publicly in the media-there is
largely no recourse. Although it is possible to underplay this by arguing that
it is only psychological damage that occurs, similar injury is recoverable on
no more than a showing of negligence,92 and in reality, we have to intuit that a
good deal of actual economic damage results from disfavor, diminished
appeal, and electability. The actual malice rule prevents public officials and
public figures-and this includes lower level public servants93 and private
persons involved in public events, 94 as well as more prominent individuals-
from recovering for whatever harm is caused by the publication of falsehoods
about them. Those classified as private individuals must also establish actual
malice in order to recover presumed or punitive damages, 95 and securing a
lawyer to sue on a contingency basis generally requires such an allegation. 9
6
Thus, protecting personal reputation and compensating its injury is the first
and most obvious casualty of constitutional actual malice rules.
There is, however, a more serious public and sociopolitical harm left by
the legacy of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan-and that is the search for truth.
Regardless of talk about the marketplace of ideas and truth prevailing over
falsity, the primary function of the Press Clause in the First Amendment is the
dissemination of accurate factual information and the presentation of
conscientious analysis to the public. In fact, that is what the actual malice rule
was designed to accomplish. 97 The theory was that much accurate, reliable
information, as well falsehoods, would be suppressed by fear of liability for
90. See, e.g., Burnett v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
91. See Roundtable, First Amendment on Trial-The Libel Lawyer's Perspective, 23 SEATTLE
U. L. REv. 849, 855-56 (2000) (statement of John Shaeffer, one of founding partners in O'Donnell &
Shaeffer in Los Angeles).
92. Anderson, supra note 4, at 501.
93. Id. at 524.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 525.
96. Id.
97. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964).
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defamation-the dreaded self-censorship effect. 98  It can be argued that
somewhat the opposite has occurred. The media, relieved of the danger of
libel liability, no longer is concerned about the publication of false, libelous
stories. Instead of libel law that discourages the censorship of reliable
material, we have a constitutional law of libel that encourages the
dissemination of falsity. These conflicting sides of the coin-discouraging
self-censorship of accurate information on the one side and encouraging the
publication of inaccuracy on the other-depend for domination on the
dynamics of press behavior. It was the potential for the predominance of the
latter that the Supreme Court did not foresee or appreciate when it decided the
early New York Times line of cases. Now, whatever self-censorship is
avoided is surely overcompensated by the distribution of falsehoods,
exaggeration, and sensationalism. The reading and listening public in a
participatory democracy is no better off for this. The social cost of the New
York Times rule has been a dramatic impact on the marketplace of information
by polluting it with misinformation. When this is combined with press
fixation on marginally relevant issues and sensationalism, real news and
analysis suffer. This is not healthy for a system of freedom of expression,
which depends on truth prevailing over falsity to facilitate self-government
and personal decisionmaking. A news media that is undeterred by any form
of accountability ill serves the public and participatory democracy.
The current news climate is essentially one of scandal, sensationalism, and
blame, typified by media coverage in the summer of 2001 of the Chandra
Levy disappearance. Bill Press, co-host of CNN's "Crossfire" had this to say:
The summer of 2001 . . . will be remembered as the time
when the American media, once and for all, destroyed its own
reputation for objectivity and integrity. It will be
remembered as the "Summer of Chandra Levy" and a
textbook case of media overkill. Both in print and on
television, the press managed to turn the Levy case into a
sleazy summer novel-with just as many cheap thrills, and
just as few actual facts. 99
Press went on to point out the media hysteria and inaccuracies, that over
800,000 persons were missing in 2001 alone, how the media continued to
98. See id.
99. Bill Press, Editorial, Chandra Sends Media Into Insanity, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W.
Va.), Aug. 8, 2001, at 4A.
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allow Chandra Levy's family to defame Gary Condit, 00 and concluded
"[w]ithout the facts, it is not fair to destroy any person's reputation-not even
a politician's. It is not honest to devote hours to chewing, discussing, and
speculating about sensational 'new' developments without first determining
their accuracy."' 10 1 This is but one example of a news media driven by
competition to exalt scandal and sensationalism over substantive coverage of
issues.
This kind of reporting is self-propelling and self-fulfilling. From both the
perspectives of the public and the press, it is easier to focus on and exaggerate
scandal and lay blame than it is to investigate, analyze, and report on hard
news. 0 2 The latter takes more effort and is less appealing to much of the
public, if for no other reason than this is the diet it has come to expect.
Competition from technology and the proliferation of news outlets have also
placed a premium on quick and easy coverage, in which careful investigation
and accuracy are dispensable. Of course, it is the actual malice standard that
makes this all possible, allowing an emphasis on scandal and blame without
concern for the truth. The public and press are both losers. The public misses
the hard news it deserves, and the press loses the confidence of the public
because of the circus atmosphere and lack of substantive coverage.
There is one further, more subtle deleterious effect produced by the actual
malice rule, and the cost here might be the highest. With open season on
public officials and public figures, it must be assumed that many good and
talented people are discouraged from seeking public life.10 3 We are not only
speaking of those who might achieve national prominence or elected office,
but also of low ranking public employees and those who might become
involved in local affairs for they are also considered public persons under the
constitutional malice rules. Surely those who are inclined to seek public
office or otherwise aspire to public prominence are aware that their lives will
become an open book at the hands of the press, but with respect to other less
prominent people the media is also immune from any kind of conscience for
decency. This surely has the effect of discouraging capable folks from
seeking public office, public attention, or in any way dealing with or attracting
the attention of the press. Thus, the actual malice standard deters qualified
and capable people from participating in political or public life.
100. On the August 2, 2001, airing of CNN's Wolf Blitzer Reports, Chandra Levy's aunt was
allowed to state that Condit's marriage to his present wife was a "marriage of convenience."
101. Press, supra note 99.
102. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 533-34.
103. Id.
[89:739
JOURNALISM POLICE
III. JOURNALISM POLICE
This all suggests that some control on media behavior is needed for the
sake of the First Amendment's marketplace of information as well as common
decency and the protection of personal reputation. The only kind of press
accountability, however, the common law of libel, was virtually eliminated by
the New York Times line of cases. It seems that the actual malice rule of New
York Times has not withstood the test of time and has outlived its usefulness.
At the time New York Times was decided, the press was subject to a very
lenient standard of liability-strict liability unless the defense could prove the
story true. There is no need now to return to that regime, but the negligence
standard of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. has considerable appeal. Combining
the negligence standard with other developments in the constitutional law of
libel would leave the news media with substantial protection.
The Supreme -Court has a ready means available to conform the actual
malice rule of New York Times to the negligence standard of Gertz. The
distinctions the Court drew in Gertz between public and private plaintiffs
were never persuasive, and they were effectively dismantled by the arguments
of those who favored application of the actual malice rule to all plaintiffs. 104
Given the changed nature of the modem news media and the lessons of
history, these same arguments against a public/private person distinction now
could be used to adopt a negligence standard in the case of all plaintiffs. In so
doing, a modicum of responsibility would be placed on the press. The
distinction between public persons-public officials and public figures-and
private individuals never made sense. The focus of constitutional significance
in terms of the policy underlying freedom of the press should be on whether
the publication involved a matter of public interest; that is what justifies press
coverage in terms of both the role of the press as disseminator of information
and as public watchdog.1 05 Determining whether a story is of public interest
is also an easier standard to apply than the slippery definition of "public
official" 10 6 and the rather arcane definition of "public figure." 10 7 Thus as
both a matter of policy and practicality, the much more sensible standard was
the "public interest" focus of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 108
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Gertz determined that the reputations of
private individuals were more deserving of protection for two reasons: since
104. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 500.
105. See Gerald G. Ashdown, Of Public Figures and Public Interest-The Libel Law
Conundrum, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 937 (1984).
106. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966).
107. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
108. 403 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1971).
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private individuals lacked access to the channels of communication to rebut
false statements, they were more vulnerable to injury than public figures and,
unlike public persons, they had not assumed the risk of publicity. 1
09
Justice Brennan effectively debunked the access to the channel of
communication argument in his plurality opinion in Rosenbloom1° and his
dissenting opinion in Gertz."' He pointed out that access to the media exists
only for very prominent people, and for all others, whether public or private,
access depends on the unpredictable and uncontrollable event of continuing
media interest." 2  He also noted that even where access to the media is
available, denial rarely overtakes the original charge. 13 "Denials, retractions,
and corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the prominence of the
original story.""14 In other words, as the majority itself in Gertz admitted,
"the truth rarely catches up with a lie." 115  Pragmatically speaking, even
where a story receives substantial media attention, both the initial source and
competitors have a natural, professional disinclination to challenge the
original story. Justice Brennan was surely correct when he stated that the self-
help dichotomy "seems too insubstantial a reed on which to rest a
constitutional distinction."' 16
The assumption of the risk argument, on which the Court relied more
heavily, is equally unpersuasive. There are any number of things wrong with
this part of Justice Powell's majority opinion in Gertz. First, it largely
depends on the definitions of public official and public figure. With respect to
public officials, to the extent that Justice Powell was relying on "[a]n
individual who decides to seek governmental office," ' 1 7 it ignores a whole
score of lower-level public servants, like police officers, who are classified as
public officials by the courts.11 8 To the extent that those who seek elective
office might recognize the concomitant risk of publicity and exposure, the
assumption of risk argument has little application to a person who is classified
as a "public official" simply because he holds some minor government
position. 119
109. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45.
110. 403 U.S. at 46.
111. 418 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 45-46.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 46.
115. 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
116. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 47.
117. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
118. Anderson, supra note 4, at 527-28.
119. Id.
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The waiver argument is particularly inapt with respect to public figures.
According to the majority in Gertz, the more common type of public figure
are those that "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."
' 120
But those who are civic-minded enough, or who are interested enough to
voluntarily become involved in public issues or events, have not accepted, nor
should they have to accept, the same risk of scrutiny of their lives as those
who seek public office. It is at this juncture that the waiver argument for
those becoming involved in public issues (as well as those seeking office) has
an unfortunate deterrent impact. Additionally, the otherwise private person
who becomes a limited public figure because of involvement in public affairs
assumes the risk of media attention to a degree only slightly different from
those who would otherwise be classified as private individuals. In our highly
mobile, visible, and interactive society, the risk of attracting the attention of
the press is as apparent as it is unpredictable. Becoming involved in any
number of events, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, e.g., from an accident,
natural disaster to a winning lottery ticket (i.e., good luck or bad), makes us
vulnerable to media exposure. Again, it is the nature of the event-whether it
is of public interest-rather than the status of the participant that creates the
risk.
Even those labeled "public figures" because they "achieve such pervasive
fame or notoriety that [they] become[] . . . public figure[s] for all purposes
and in all contexts" 12' are not like Justice Powell's paradigmatic public
official who, through seeking public office, invites inquiry into his or her
public and private life, both being relevant to fitness for public service. A
person who gains fame and notoriety because of success or a particular talent,
such as an actor, athlete, or musician, certainly has not voluntarily exposed his
or her private life to public discussion and ridicule at the hands of the media.
The private lives of such persons are largely irrelevant to their status. Nor do
most persons with general fame use their prominence in an attempt to
persuade others or influence the resolution of public controversies. Some
do, 22 but most do not.
Consequently, assumption of the risk is not a sound rationale on which to
distinguish the reputations of most public persons. At best, the waiver theory
might apply to those who seek elective office, and even here we would
probably be better off if it were not so. As Professor David Anderson points
120. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
121. Id. at 351.
122. Some persons who use their prominence as public figures in an attempt to influence others
become public officials, e.g., Arnold Schwarzenegger, Fred Thompson, and Jesse Ventura.
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out, the waiver theory is circular. 123 If public officials and figures sacrifice
their reputations, it is only because the Supreme Court has so declared. The
Court has not provided a satisfactory explanation of why this should be so.
The access to the channels of communication to reply and assumption of the
risk arguments are illogical and fallacious. In reality, these unpersuasive
notions may have been employed in Gertz not simply to provide some
protection to the reputations of private individuals, but also to establish a
measure of media accountability. 124  If the reputations of private persons
deserve an accounting, there is no good reason not to provide the same
remedy to all plaintiffs, for the same policy reasons. Recognition of the
flawed analysis in Gertz leaves the Court with two choices. The Court can
return to Rosenbloom, applying the actual malice standard to all persons
involved in matters of public interest, or the Court can hold the negligence
standard applicable to all plaintiffs in all cases. Given the fiascos of the
modern media, the choice seems clear.
The response to the concern over self-censorship and freedom of the press
is straightforward. There certainly would be no return to the pre-New York
Times regime. First, plaintiffs would have to establish both falsity and fault,
in the form of negligence, to recover. 125  Even when these hurdles are
surmounted, presumed and punitive damages would be unavailable in the
absence of proof of actual malice. 126 Although the Court did state that actual
injury was not confined to out-of-pocket loss and could include harm to
reputation, personal humiliation, and emotional injury, 27 this does not seem
remarkable once the plaintiff has established that the defendant negligently
published falsehoods about him or her. In any event, media defendants will
remain protected by judicial deference to freedom of the press. As indicated
earlier, dismissal, summary judgments, overturning jury verdicts, and
reversals on appeal following de novo review of the facts continue to provide
sufficient vigilance over First Amendment interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
On the other side of the equation, vigilance on the part of the news media,
beholden to liability for negligence, is not a bad thing. At least the
appearance of the potential for redress might encourage some investigation or
123. Anderson, supra note 4, at 528.
124. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
125. Anderson, supra note 4, at 501.
126. Id. at 525.
127. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 393 n.29.
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inquiry before every tip, leak, or piece of gossip is published. The need to
break a story fueled by competition and followed by the herd mentality results
in the widespread publication of much misinformation. Again, the Gary
Condit/Chandra Levy story provides excellent examples: before her
disappearance, Levy was reported to have made a number of last minute
phone calls to Condit, but her phone records indicated there were none; it was
widely reported that Condit had an affair with an eighteen-year-old girl in
California, but the FBI later said the girl's father was lying; and the last rumor
circulated by the news media that Levy's body was buried under a parking lot
being constructed at Fort Lee, Virginia, had been received by the FBI a week
earlier and was determined to be a hoax. 128
If a negligence standard causes the press to withhold some stories for
verification or prevents publication altogether, the contemporary record
suggests that this censors the publication of more inaccurate, defamatory
material than useful, accurate, and conscientious reporting. A negligence
standard surrounded by all the other built-in protections for the media
mentioned above-plaintiffs required to prove falsity and fault, limitation of
damages, and careful judicial supervision-suggests that only stories at the
margins will be suppressed. This kind of tempering of the unrestrained power
of the twenty-first century press is healthy for the First Amendment. Freedom
of the press does not require an untamed news media, no matter what the cost.
Madison and Jefferson foresaw in freedom of expression the ability to
criticize government and disseminate information to the public so that they
could govern themselves effectively. 129 This is still true, but it is a theory
based largely on accurate and honest reporting. Our system of freedom of
expression needs adjustment over time. It certainly is not benefited by a
powerful, uncontrolled press with no mechanism available to filter out
misinformation. The time for the journalism police may have arrived.
128. Bob Dart, Levy Tip Merely A Hoax, Says FBI, Atlanta J. Const., Aug. 3, 2001, at A6.
129. Margaret A. Blanchard, Why Can't We Ever Learn? Cycles of Stability, Stress and
Freedom of Expression in United States History, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 347, 3 52-54 (2002).
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